macOS Kernel Extensions & Debugging

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Basic Information

Kernel extensions (Kexts) are packages with a .kext extension that are loaded directly into the macOS kernel space, providing additional functionality to the main operating system.

Deprecation status & DriverKit / System Extensions

Starting with macOS Catalina (10.15) Apple marked most legacy KPIs as deprecated and introduced the System Extensions & DriverKit frameworks that run in user-space. From macOS Big Sur (11) the operating system will refuse to load third-party kexts that rely on deprecated KPIs unless the machine is booted in Reduced Security mode. On Apple Silicon, enabling kexts additionally requires the user to:

  1. Reboot into RecoveryStartup Security Utility.
  2. Select Reduced Security and tick “Allow user management of kernel extensions from identified developers”.
  3. Reboot and approve the kext from System Settings → Privacy & Security.

User-land drivers written with DriverKit/System Extensions dramatically reduce attack surface because crashes or memory corruption are confined to a sandboxed process rather than kernel space.

📝 From macOS Sequoia (15) Apple has removed several legacy networking and USB KPIs entirely – the only forward-compatible solution for vendors is to migrate to System Extensions.

Requirements

Obviously, this is so powerful that it is complicated to load a kernel extension. These are the requirements that a kernel extension must meet to be loaded:

  • When entering recovery mode, kernel extensions must be allowed to be loaded:
  • The kernel extension must be signed with a kernel code signing certificate, which can only be granted by Apple. Who will review in detail the company and the reasons why it is needed.
  • The kernel extension must also be notarized, Apple will be able to check it for malware.
  • Then, the root user is the one who can load the kernel extension and the files inside the package must belong to root.
  • During the upload process, the package must be prepared in a protected non-root location: /Library/StagedExtensions (requires the com.apple.rootless.storage.KernelExtensionManagement grant).
  • Finally, when attempting to load it, the user will receive a confirmation request and, if accepted, the computer must be restarted to load it.

Loading process

In Catalina it was like this: It is interesting to note that the verification process occurs in userland. However, only applications with the com.apple.private.security.kext-management grant can request the kernel to load an extension: kextcache, kextload, kextutil, kextd, syspolicyd

  1. kextutil cli starts the verification process for loading an extension
    • It will talk to kextd by sending using a Mach service.
  2. kextd will check several things, such as the signature
    • It will talk to syspolicyd to check if the extension can be loaded.
  3. syspolicyd will prompt the user if the extension has not been previously loaded.
    • syspolicyd will report the result to kextd
  4. kextd will finally be able to tell the kernel to load the extension

If kextd is not available, kextutil can perform the same checks.

Enumeration & management (loaded kexts)

kextstat was the historical tool but it is deprecated in recent macOS releases. The modern interface is kmutil:

bash
# List every extension currently linked in the kernel, sorted by load address
sudo kmutil showloaded --sort

# Show only third-party / auxiliary collections
sudo kmutil showloaded --collection aux

# Unload a specific bundle
sudo kmutil unload -b com.example.mykext

Older syntax is still available for reference:

bash
# (Deprecated) Get loaded kernel extensions
kextstat

# (Deprecated) Get dependencies of the kext number 22
kextstat | grep " 22 " | cut -c2-5,50- | cut -d '(' -f1

kmutil inspect can also be leveraged to dump the contents of a Kernel Collection (KC) or verify that a kext resolves all symbol dependencies:

bash
# List fileset entries contained in the boot KC
kmutil inspect -B /System/Library/KernelCollections/BootKernelExtensions.kc --show-fileset-entries

# Check undefined symbols of a 3rd party kext before loading
kmutil libraries -p /Library/Extensions/FancyUSB.kext --undef-symbols

Kernelcache

caution

Even though the kernel extensions are expected to be in /System/Library/Extensions/, if you go to this folder you won't find any binary. This is because of the kernelcache and in order to reverse one .kext you need to find a way to obtain it.

The kernelcache is a pre-compiled and pre-linked version of the XNU kernel, along with essential device drivers and kernel extensions. It's stored in a compressed format and gets decompressed into memory during the boot-up process. The kernelcache facilitates a faster boot time by having a ready-to-run version of the kernel and crucial drivers available, reducing the time and resources that would otherwise be spent on dynamically loading and linking these components at boot time.

Local Kerlnelcache

In iOS it's located in /System/Library/Caches/com.apple.kernelcaches/kernelcache in macOS you can find it with: find / -name "kernelcache" 2>/dev/null
In my case in macOS I found it in:

  • /System/Volumes/Preboot/1BAEB4B5-180B-4C46-BD53-51152B7D92DA/boot/DAD35E7BC0CDA79634C20BD1BD80678DFB510B2AAD3D25C1228BB34BCD0A711529D3D571C93E29E1D0C1264750FA043F/System/Library/Caches/com.apple.kernelcaches/kernelcache

IMG4

The IMG4 file format is a container format used by Apple in its iOS and macOS devices for securely storing and verifying firmware components (like kernelcache). The IMG4 format includes a header and several tags which encapsulate different pieces of data including the actual payload (like a kernel or bootloader), a signature, and a set of manifest properties. The format supports cryptographic verification, allowing the device to confirm the authenticity and integrity of the firmware component before executing it.

It's usually composed of the following components:

  • Payload (IM4P):
    • Often compressed (LZFSE4, LZSS, …)
    • Optionally encrypted
  • Manifest (IM4M):
    • Contains Signature
    • Additional Key/Value dictionary
  • Restore Info (IM4R):
    • Also known as APNonce
    • Prevents replaying of some updates
    • OPTIONAL: Usually this isn't found

Decompress the Kernelcache:

bash
# img4tool (https://github.com/tihmstar/img4tool)
img4tool -e kernelcache.release.iphone14 -o kernelcache.release.iphone14.e

# pyimg4 (https://github.com/m1stadev/PyIMG4)
pyimg4 im4p extract -i kernelcache.release.iphone14 -o kernelcache.release.iphone14.e

Download

In https://github.com/dortania/KdkSupportPkg/releases it's possible to find all the kernel debug kits. You can download it, mount it, open it with Suspicious Package tool, access the .kext folder and extract it.

Check it for symbols with:

bash
nm -a ~/Downloads/Sandbox.kext/Contents/MacOS/Sandbox | wc -l

Sometime Apple releases kernelcache with symbols. You can download some firmwares with symbols by following links on those pages. The firmwares will contain the kernelcache among other files.

To extract the files start by changing the extension from .ipsw to .zip and unzip it.

After extracting the firmware you will get a file like: kernelcache.release.iphone14. It's in IMG4 format, you can extract the interesting info with:

pyimg4:

bash
pyimg4 im4p extract -i kernelcache.release.iphone14 -o kernelcache.release.iphone14.e

img4tool:

bash
img4tool -e kernelcache.release.iphone14 -o kernelcache.release.iphone14.e

Inspecting kernelcache

Check if the kernelcache has symbols with

bash
nm -a kernelcache.release.iphone14.e | wc -l

With this we can now extract all the extensions or the one you are interested in:

bash
# List all extensions
kextex -l kernelcache.release.iphone14.e
## Extract com.apple.security.sandbox
kextex -e com.apple.security.sandbox kernelcache.release.iphone14.e

# Extract all
kextex_all kernelcache.release.iphone14.e

# Check the extension for symbols
nm -a binaries/com.apple.security.sandbox | wc -l

Recent vulnerabilities & exploitation techniques

YearCVESummary
2024CVE-2024-44243Logic flaw in storagekitd allowed a root attacker to register a malicious file-system bundle that ultimately loaded an unsigned kext, bypassing System Integrity Protection (SIP) and enabling persistent rootkits. Patched in macOS 14.2 / 15.2.
2021CVE-2021-30892 (Shrootless)Installation daemon with the entitlement com.apple.rootless.install could be abused to execute arbitrary post-install scripts, disable SIP and load arbitrary kexts.

Take-aways for red-teamers

  1. Look for entitled daemons (codesign -dvv /path/bin | grep entitlements) that interact with Disk Arbitration, Installer or Kext Management.
  2. Abusing SIP bypasses almost always grants the ability to load a kext → kernel code execution.

Defensive tips

Keep SIP enabled, monitor for kmutil load/kmutil create -n aux invocations coming from non-Apple binaries and alert on any write to /Library/Extensions. Endpoint Security events ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_KEXTLOAD provide near real-time visibility.

Debugging macOS kernel & kexts

Apple’s recommended workflow is to build a Kernel Debug Kit (KDK) that matches the running build and then attach LLDB over a KDP (Kernel Debugging Protocol) network session.

One-shot local debug of a panic

bash
# Create a symbolication bundle for the latest panic
sudo kdpwrit dump latest.kcdata
kmutil analyze-panic latest.kcdata -o ~/panic_report.txt

Live remote debugging from another Mac

  1. Download + install the exact KDK version for the target machine.
  2. Connect the target Mac and the host Mac with a USB-C or Thunderbolt cable.
  3. On the target:
bash
sudo nvram boot-args="debug=0x100 kdp_match_name=macbook-target"
reboot
  1. On the host:
bash
lldb
(lldb) kdp-remote "udp://macbook-target"
(lldb) bt  # get backtrace in kernel context

Attaching LLDB to a specific loaded kext

bash
# Identify load address of the kext
ADDR=$(kmutil showloaded --bundle-identifier com.example.driver | awk '{print $4}')

# Attach
sudo lldb -n kernel_task -o "target modules load --file /Library/Extensions/Example.kext/Contents/MacOS/Example --slide $ADDR"

ℹ️ KDP only exposes a read-only interface. For dynamic instrumentation you will need to patch the binary on-disk, leverage kernel function hooking (e.g. mach_override) or migrate the driver to a hypervisor for full read/write.

References

  • DriverKit Security – Apple Platform Security Guide
  • Microsoft Security Blog – Analyzing CVE-2024-44243 SIP bypass

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