ksmbd streams_xattr OOB write β†’ local LPE (CVE-2025-37947)

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This page documents a deterministic out-of-bounds write in ksmbd streams handling that enables a reliable Linux kernel privilege escalation on Ubuntu 22.04 LTS (5.15.0-153-generic), bypassing KASLR, SMEP, and SMAP using standard kernel heap primitives (msg_msg + pipe_buffer).

  • Affected component: fs/ksmbd/vfs.c β€” ksmbd_vfs_stream_write()
  • Primitive: page-overflow OOB write past a 0x10000-byte kvmalloc() buffer
  • Preconditions: ksmbd running with an authenticated, writable share using vfs streams_xattr

Example smb.conf

ini
[share]
    path = /share
    vfs objects = streams_xattr
    writeable = yes

Root cause (allocation clamped, memcpy at unclamped offset)

  • The function computes size = *pos + count, clamps size to XATTR_SIZE_MAX (0x10000) when exceeded, and recomputes count = (*pos + count) - 0x10000, but still performs memcpy(&stream_buf[*pos], buf, count) into a 0x10000-byte buffer. If *pos β‰₯ 0x10000 the destination pointer is already outside the allocation, producing an OOB write of count bytes.
Vulnerable function snippet (ksmbd_vfs_stream_write)
c
// https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v5.15/source/fs/ksmbd/vfs.c#L411
static int ksmbd_vfs_stream_write(struct ksmbd_file *fp, char *buf, loff_t *pos, size_t count)
{
    char *stream_buf = NULL, *wbuf;
    size_t size;
    ...
    size = *pos + count;
    if (size > XATTR_SIZE_MAX) {             // [1] clamp allocation, but...
        size = XATTR_SIZE_MAX;
        count = (*pos + count) - XATTR_SIZE_MAX; // [1.1] ...recompute count
    }
    wbuf = kvmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO); // [2] alloc 0x10000
    stream_buf = wbuf;
    memcpy(&stream_buf[*pos], buf, count);         // [3] OOB when *pos >= 0x10000
    ...
    kvfree(stream_buf);
    return err;
}

Offset steering and OOB length

  • Example: set file offset (pos) to 0x10018 and original length (count) to 8. After clamping, count' = (0x10018 + 8) - 0x10000 = 0x20, but memcpy writes 32 bytes starting at stream_buf[0x10018], i.e., 0x18 bytes beyond the 16-page allocation.

Triggering the bug via SMB streams write

  • Use the same authenticated SMB connection to open a file on the share and issue a write to a named stream (streams_xattr). Set file_offset β‰₯ 0x10000 with a small length to generate a deterministic OOB write of controllable size.
  • libsmb2 can be used to authenticate and craft such writes over SMB2/3.

Minimal reachability (concept)

c
// Pseudocode: send SMB streams write with pos=0x0000010018ULL, len=8
smb2_session_login(...);
smb2_open("\\\\host\\share\\file:stream", ...);
smb2_pwrite(fd, payload, 8, 0x0000010018ULL); // yields 32-byte OOB

Allocator behavior and why page shaping is required

  • kvmalloc(0x10000, GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_ZERO) requests an order-4 (16 contiguous pages) allocation from the buddy allocator when size > KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE. This is not a SLUB cache object.
  • memcpy occurs immediately after allocation; post-allocation spraying is ineffective. You must pre-groom physical memory so that a chosen target lies immediately after the allocated 16-page block.
  • On Ubuntu, GFP_KERNEL often pulls from the Unmovable migrate type in zone Normal. Exhaust order-3 and order-4 freelists to force the allocator to split an order-5 block into an adjacent order-4 + order-3 pair, then park an order-3 slab (kmalloc-cg-4k) directly after the stream buffer.

Practical page shaping strategy

  • Spray ~1000–2000 msg_msg objects of ~4096 bytes (fits kmalloc-cg-4k) to populate order-3 slabs.
  • Receive some messages to punch holes and encourage adjacency.
  • Trigger the ksmbd OOB repeatedly until the order-4 stream buffer lands immediately before a msg_msg slab. Use eBPF tracing to confirm addresses and alignment if available.

Useful observability

bash
# Check per-order freelists and migrate types
sudo cat /proc/pagetypeinfo | sed -n '/Node 0, zone  Normal/,/Node/p'
# Example tracer (see reference repo) to log kvmalloc addresses/sizes
sudo ./bpf-tracer.sh

Exploitation plan (msg_msg + pipe_buffer), adapted from CVE-2021-22555

  1. Spray many System V msg_msg primary/secondary messages (4KiB-sized to fit kmalloc-cg-4k).
  2. Trigger ksmbd OOB to corrupt a primary message’s next pointer so that two primaries share one secondary.
  3. Detect the corrupted pair by tagging queues and scanning with msgrcv(MSG_COPY) to find mismatched tags.
  4. Free the real secondary to create a UAF; reclaim it with controlled data via UNIX sockets (craft a fake msg_msg).
  5. Leak kernel heap pointers by abusing m_ts over-read in copy_msg to obtain mlist.next/mlist.prev (SMAP bypass).
  6. With an sk_buff spray, rebuild a consistent fake msg_msg with valid links and free it normally to stabilize state.
  7. Reclaim the UAF with struct pipe_buffer objects; leak anon_pipe_buf_ops to compute kernel base (defeat KASLR).
  8. Spray a fake pipe_buf_operations with release pointing to a stack pivot/ROP gadget; close pipes to execute and gain root.

Bypasses and notes

  • KASLR: leak anon_pipe_buf_ops, compute base (kbase_addr) and gadget addresses.
  • SMEP/SMAP: execute ROP in kernel context via pipe_buf_operations->release flow; avoid userspace derefs until after disable/prepare_kernel_cred/commit_creds chain.
  • Hardened usercopy: not applicable to this page overflow primitive; corruption targets are non-usercopy fields.

Reliability

  • High once adjacency is achieved; occasional misses or panics (<10%). Tuning spray/free counts improves stability. Overwriting two LSBs of a pointer to induce specific collisions was reported as effective (e.g., write 0x0000_0000_0000_0500 pattern into the overlap).

Key parameters to tune

  • Number of msg_msg sprays and hole pattern
  • OOB offset (pos) and resulting OOB length (count')
  • Number of UNIX socket, sk_buff, and pipe_buffer sprays during each stage

Mitigations and reachability

  • Fix: clamp both allocation and destination/length or bound memcpy against the allocated size; upstream patches track as CVE-2025-37947.
  • Remote exploitation would additionally require a reliable infoleak and remote heap grooming; this write-up focuses on local LPE.

References PoC and tooling

  • libsmb2 for SMB auth and streams writes
  • eBPF tracer script to log kvmalloc addresses and histogram allocations (e.g., grep 4048 out-4096.txt)
  • Minimal reachability PoC and full local exploit are publicly available (see References)

References

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